

	d For Release 2007/04/20 : CIA-RDP83	
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	THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL IN	ITELLIGENCE
	WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505	•
lational Intelligence Offic	ers	
		23 July 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligen Deputy Director of Central Int	ce elligence
THROUGH :	National Intelligence Officer	for Warning
FROM :	Assistant NIO for Latin Americ	ca ca
SUBJECT :	Monthly Warning Assessment: L	atin America
1. <u>Cuba</u>		
Photog	graphy reveals an unusual concent	tration of airlift capacity
at Playa Barrac troops are head	coa Airfield <u>(just west of Havana</u>	a / Wilete Cuba S ettice para-
But t	nere is at least a small chance i	the move reflects growing Cuban
h+ d	with potential developments in Nefense pact. The Sandinistas do	rear a major scepup of decrois
by armed dissi	dents/exiles (though this is not	lisorders. Analysts are con-
tinuing to pay Cuba and Nicar	close attention to any and all	potential indicators both in
2. El Sa		
Deriva	te sector criticism of the Chris This sort of continuing discord,	tian Democrats is becoming

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	25 X 1
conversation with a visiting US official, evinced uncharacteristic pessimism. Friction among moderate groups is hampering the preparation for next year's elections, and may yet embolden military and civilian rightwing extremists, always eager to exploit any opportunity to scuttle the electoral process altogether.	25X1
3. <u>Honduras</u>	
The security forces are adopting increasingly aggressive tactics, both against political figures on the extreme left and against common criminals. The tougher tactics reflect concern over domestic terrorist acts, the subversive and military intentions of Nicaragua, the guerrilla war next door in El Salvador, and the increase in ordinary crime. Death squad activity is picking up; at least one political prisoner has been executed; and the security forces reportedly have permission to eliminate anyone who perpetrates a terrorist act. Most Hondurans appear more or less indifferent at this point. There is some danger, though, that if the tough tactics escalate further, they could induce a cycle of retaliation and recrimination that would involve many more Hondurans and affect the country's relative social peace.	25X1
4. <u>Nicaragua</u>	
The unexpected departure of Vice Minister of Defense Eden Pastora comes at a particularly bad time for the Sandinistas. Pastora left, he said, to resume being an active revolutionary elsewherepresumably in El Salvador or Guatemala. The departure is fueling speculation in and out of Nicaragua about just how bad growing splits among the Sandinistas really are, as well as recriminations within the regime over the handling of the Pastora issue. Moreover, his vow to make revolution elsewhere adds to the fears and suspicions of neighboring Guatemala and Honduras, and could embolden Nicaraguan exile groups.	25X1
President Viola's immediate prospects appear slightly improved, but intractable political economic problems continue to plague him. His authority is undermined by the military junta that selected him, and he appears to lack the political toughness to do more than temporize. Key labor and political groups—long sidelined by the military governments—are becoming more restive. If Viola fails to keep civilian pressures within "acceptable" limits, he could find himself in serious trouble with fellow officers who are not prepared to accept the reemergence of major civilian influence.	25X1
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Cy 17 - SA/CI Cy 18 - D/OCO Cy 19 - D/OCR Cy 20 - D/OER Cy 21 - D/OGSR

Cy 13 - NIO/WE

Cy 22 - D/0IA Cy 23 - D/OPA Cy 24 - D/OSR Cy 25 - D/OSWR

Cy 26 - AS/NFAC Cy 27 - C/CA/IADCy 28 - NFAC Reg

Cy 29 - ER Cys 30, 31 - NIO/LA

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